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1  Space and Place
At the very outset of his discussion of space, in the first part of Raum 
und Zeit, a work composed in haste at the end of his life and published 
posthumously by his students—the ‘feather’ fell from the author’s hand 
mid-composition (RZ: iv),1 we are told—Anton Marty introduces a 
number of ways in which ‘Raum’ (space), and the related term ‘Ort’ 
(place) can be used. At least some of these uses are centrally relevant 
to his exploration. More than that, they set the data for his treatise in a 
way to be made clear.
Marty at once dispenses with two uses; a ‘social’ use which he con-
cedes may even be primary, whereby ‘place’ is understood to be an 
‘inhabited space’; and one which might be expressed in English as 
‘ terminus’—the end of some process or thing (for instance, the ground 
may be the ‘place’ for fallen things). He observes that sometimes ‘Ort’ 
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2     C. Mac Cumhaill
and ‘Raum’ are used interchangeably, sometimes synonymously. The 
example he gives is striking:
Der Körper ist an dem Orte” heißt ganz dasselbe wie “er ist in dem 
Raume. (RZ, §1: 3)
There is a like parallel in English. ‘an dem Orte’ is naturally translated 
in English as ‘at the place’. But while ‘at’ may be distinguished from ‘in’ 
insofar as the former refers to a place idealised as a zero-dimensional 
topological point and the latter a place idealised as two-dimensional 
area or a three-dimensional volume (Wesche 1985: 385), we typically 
tend to think, and say, that things ‘in’ space, in being in space, are ‘at’ 
places. On this intuitive conception, a place is understood to be a spa-
tial region of limited extent, a use of ‘place’ that Marty also catalogues 
and which goes hand in hand with the conception of space that I note 
in closing. For now, I can be brief.
Places are countable and ‘spaces’ may be too. ‘Space’, however, is 
often used as a mass noun like sugar or rain; we may speak of there 
being more or less ‘space’ (notice, it is less felicitous to say more or less 
‘place’). In everyday English, we also sometimes speak of there being 
more or less ‘room’, a term cognate with the German term ‘Raum’. 
Marty’s exploration evidences that his ‘Raum’ encompasses what we 
call ‘room’—a space for a purpose or a person, a space which is often 
enclosed. But the English word ‘space’, and certainly in recent analytic 
philosophical use, is less embracive.
Finally, Marty introduces two analogous uses where ‘place’ and ‘space’ 
overlap. Empty places are those that can be easily passed through and 
filled, while ‘the space of a body’ refers to its cubic content or three- 
dimensional extent. Critically, Marty writes that the latter concept 
‘ presupposes a local positivity that is not identical with it [the body]’ 
(RZ, §1: 4). Let us call this the Naive Presupposition—‘naïve’ since it 
tallies, I think, with our pre-theoretic ontology of perceptual space. Or 
so I shall assume.
Marty takes it that what exists is the subject of true affirmative 
judgement—viz. a judgement with the content that ‘x is’ or, in this 
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mysteriously, it seems we can truly judge of things that they are ‘in 
space’ or ‘at a place’—that an acrobat is suspended in mid-air ‘over 
there’, say. Marty’s project is to uncover the nature of this ‘what is’—
space—and the spatial relations that, as he argues, it grounds, and he 
does so by arguing against a series of philosophical fathers, among them 
Descartes, Berkeley, Kant and his former teacher Brentano, a dialectical 
strategy that, as Simons (1990: 157) notes is by no means advantageous. 
In particular, Marty’s positive view, which is interpolated with polemic, 
is motivated mostly negatively. By sifting a number of positive claims 
from the earlier sections of Raum und Zeit—the section entitled ‘vom 
Raume’—I have a go at setting a Martyan picture of space perception 
against the backdrop of contemporary philosophy of perception.
The paper unfolds as follows. In Sect. 2, I sketch two charges that 
Marty raises against Kant and Brentano. Both charges are descriptive 
and conceptual. Kant’s descriptive phenomenology is inadequate, Marty 
urges. ‘Form’ is in no sense prior to ‘matter’. But it follows from this 
exploration, in ways I will explain, that Brentano’s empirical psychology 
is also inadequate, and this despite its anti-Kantian flavour. From there, 
I outline Marty’s unusual ontology of space (Sect. 3). Marty has it that 
spatial relations are non-real but existent, causally inert relations that are 
grounded in space, which is itself non-real but existent. Objects do not 
inhere in space in the way properties inhere in substances. Rather, there 
is a primitive non-real relation of ‘fulfillment’ (Erfüllung) that holds 
between objects and places in space, which itself subsists.2
In Sect. 4, I consider whether any contemporary philosophy of per-
ception is equipped to make sense of Martyan space perception, and I 
suggest that the most promising conception is Naïve Realism. I support 
my proposal by drawing on some limited remarks that Marty makes in 
a short correspondence with Husserl.3 I then outline a difficulty for this 
theoretical translation.
Naïve Realism is a direct theory of perception which is often cast 
as relationalist: Perceptions are fundamentally conscious experiences 
in which the perceiver is directly acquainted with mind-independent 
worldly objects, events, and, for some, regions of space and intervals 
of time. Thus, S perceives O, just in case S stands in such a psycho-
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primitive, and, typically, is conceived as a relation of perceptual aware-
ness. As we shall see, the worldly objects of one’s acquaintance partly, 
though constitutively, determine conscious character.4
For Marty, however, all relations are non-real. Further, insofar as they 
are grounded, they are not fundamental. But in this sense, it might 
be supposed that they ought not to be construed as brute or primitive 
either. With this in mind, we might wonder in what sense, if any, the 
perceptual relation that the Naïve Realist envisages might be conceived 
as non-real and what its real grounds could thereby be. I explore these 
matters in Sect. 5, before going on to describe a distinctively Martyan 
form of Naïve Realism, one which preserves the central theoretical tenet 
that phenomenal character is fundamentally constituted by worldly 
objects—Call this the Assimilation Thesis—but which regards the 
apparent relational structure of awareness as derived, for reasons to be 
made plain. There are two routes to explain the derivation of the struc-
ture that the standard Naïve Realist invokes in her talk of a relation of 
awareness: one is psychological and necessary, the other is artefactual. I 
make headway in spelling out the latter by bringing Marty into fleeting 
conversation with another Thomist—G.E.M. Anscombe (Sect. 6).
2  Kant and Brentano—Dimensions of a 
Critique
Marty’s Raum und Zeit has two parts; the first dealing with space, of 
which there are 33 numbered sections, the latter with time. My recon-
struction considers only the first part. Of those 33 sections, a substan-
tial number deal with the shortcomings, as Marty sees them, of central 
canonical figures—most notably, for my purposes, Kant and Brentano. 
Both of the charges that I see as relevant to my exploration (there are 
many others), Marty erects primarily on descriptive phenomenological 
grounds. Let’s start with the first objection.5
Kant is correct, says Marty, in maintaining that if anything sen-
sory is given than so is space. For Kant, notoriously, this is since the 
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is phenomenally given is given in space. But Marty wonders whether 
from this descriptively true claim, Kant’s treatment of space as a sub-
jective form of intuition is invited. Marty reads Kant’s transformation 
of Newtonian space into a subjective form of intuition as preserving 
Newton’s insistence on the unity, infinity and independence of space 
from that which fills it. In Kant’s case however, the independence cri-
terion is reconceived in the following way: the form of intuition is 
‘pure’—a priori and not dependent on quality. Marty questions this 
from a descriptive phenomenological perspective.
It is ‘undeniable’, he says, that we can only abstract spatiality from 
quality; when we see colour we see extent, and it is only by abstraction 
that we can ‘abstract’ away from the peculiarities of colour and conceive 
of spatiality as distinct from quality. Further:
Immediately and vividly we are only given the presentation of a space 
filled with quality. (RZ, §4: 8)
But, this being so, it is ‘factually above all doubt’, says Marty, that our 
intuition of space is not quality-less, or ‘pure’ in the sense specified 
above, and nor are we given an infinite space—Marty takes it as just 
obvious that our spatial vision is finite, and even very limited.6 Again, 
his point is descriptive, but he augments it with a genetic or causal 
claim: no purely empty space could affect our senses. This does not 
show that space is a subjective form of intuition however. It only shows 
that just as colour cannot be sensed without extent, the converse also 
holds. Space cannot be intuited without localised quality.7 Prima facie, 
this might be thought to suggest that Marty must deny that intuited 
space retains aspects of the Newtonian conception—most modestly, 
the thought that space is something over and above its contents, or 
that which fills it. As we will see however, though Marty agrees with 
Kant that whenever something sensible is given so is space, and while 
he argues that space cannot be given without quality—deriding, as his 
friend Carl Stumpf also does, Kant’s imaginative ‘subtraction argument’, 
something which I leave aside8—he rejects a relationist conception of 
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6     C. Mac Cumhaill
it seems, on conceptual grounds too. Thus, we find Marty writing in an 
intriguing footnote:
Kant considers the presentation of an ‘empty space’ as a posteriori. If one 
understands by this the presentation of an empty space outside the world, 
this only follows. For the presentation of a world is certainly empirical, 
and so also is the [presentation] of adjacent space, not filled with bodies, 
that would have common boundaries with that world, since the adjacent, 
as such, cannot be presented without what borders it. (RZ, §6: 17, fn. 1)9
It is notable that Marty refers here to the presentation of an empty 
space, the singularity of which must, in Kantian terms, be a  posteriori. 
This claim is difficult to make sense of, but one suggestion is the 
 following: such a presentation must be a posteriori since an empty space 
is one that is not filled with body. It is hence not ‘empty’ in the sense that 
a mere form of intuition is, viz. contentless, or without sensible mat-
ter. If correct, this suggests a further tempting line of thought. C. B. 
Martin holds that the provision of the limits of the being of presences 
(things like pens and bicycles) requires the presence of absence outwith 
those limits—the presence of absence at places where those things are 
not or empty regions.10 But if so, and if part of the concept of a body is 
that of a limited whole, then the concept of an empty space in the first 
sense (viz. not in the sense of a form of intuition) attends, or is part of 
the structure of, our concept of a body. More explicit is Marty’s critique 
of Brentano, also on conceptual grounds—and here, as Smith puts it, 
‘Marty seeks a position more commonsensical than that of his master, 
even at the price of a certain sort of theoretical inelegance’ (1990: 129). 
I detail Marty’s ‘inelegant’ theory in Sect. 3. First, some comments on 
his divergence from Brentano.
Like Marty, Brentano also maintains a form of spatial nativism—
namely, the thought that space is given as part of the originary content 
of experience: it is not a form of intuition, as Kant thought, and nor is 
form (typically the form of objects) constructed from bundles of sensa-
tion, as an empiricist might hold. Rather, colour continua are founded 
on spatial continua, the spatial extents they ‘colour’. Here ‘founded’ is a 
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as one-sided dependence.11 Since colour is founded on spatial continua, 
we cannot see colour without seeing extent.
For most of his life, Brentano maintained that spatial continua are in 
turn secondary to, or founded on, temporal continua, where this entails 
a concomitant rejection of spatial absolutism; what is spatial coincides 
with what is corporeal and only insofar as bodies persist through time 
can we say that the three-dimensional spatial continuum that they con-
stitute persists also.12 In later writing on space, however, specifically 
in the Categories, Brentano appears to grant that places are substances 
which may or may not be filled. For Smith (1990: 128), Brentano 
makes this shift so as to be able to give an account of what individuates 
otherwise qualitatively identical things. Thus, ‘[t]wo dots of identically 
the same red are individually different only because one is here, and the 
other there’ (Kat, 247, Eng tran., p. 177). But, unsurprisingly, such an 
individuation condition makes movement impossibly rare; if things are 
individuated by the places at which they are, no thing can move place 
and yet be the same.13
Marty rejects both these Brentanian theses, the earlier and the later. 
Philosophy, he says, has to ‘exercise its office by stubbornly and repeat-
edly, pointing out the questionable, even the impossibility and absurdity 
of certain conditions’ (RZ, §1: 72), words he borrows from Hermann 
von Lotze, his former dissertation supervisor (an appeal that is strik-
ing in the context of his dispute with his other mentor, Brentano). 
For Marty, that space is nothing but the ordering of bodies is one such 
absurdity. But so is the thought that movement is something merely, 
and only relative or, worse, a fiction. I will assume that this rejection 
is something that Marty thinks follows from the very concept of move-
ment. But this is not all. Recall the Naïve Presupposition has it that we 
take bodies to be at places of three-dimensional extent, where such 
places are positivities that we may say are filled—indeed, as we shall see, 
Marty takes the relation of ‘fulfilment’ as basic. The relationist about 
space can only reductively identify such places with respect to other 
bodies in the web of corporeal bodies that constitute the spatial contin-
uum. But, as such, the place at which an object is, for the spatial rela-
tionist, somehow ‘external to it’; it is individuated with respect to other 
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to how things strike us. How so? For if this were the case, he seems to 
ask, what could be the meaning or essence of what might be called the 
in-dwelling, or in-space being of a body (Innewohnen oder Im-Raum-
Sein der Körper [RZ, §15: 76])—the very space or place which the 
Naïve Presupposition presupposes that things in space occupy or fill? 
Marty characterises the alternative, reductive strategy of his opponent as 
follows:
To say that between this and another body (atom) is an empty space is 
only a pictorial way of speaking which, by a fiction of inner form of lan-
guage, puts something positive in the place of something negative. The 
correct negative form of expression would be that no other body is between 
bodies X and Y at any distance from them. Similarly, instead of: from a 
certain place, empty space expands (in the infinite), the facts can be stated 
more reasonably as: beyond a certain distance, no body is found anymore. 
(RZ, §18: 88)
Marty does not accept this negative thesis. I sketch his positive  proposal 
below. For now, it is worth noting that Brentano appears, if not to 
revert to his former position at the end of his life, then to equivocate. 
Only weeks before his death, on 23 February 1917, a year after the 
 publication of Raum und Zeit, Brentano dictated the essay ‘What we 
can learn about space and time from the conflicting errors of philoso-
phers’. Brentano, it seems, wants to reclaim the thesis that empty space 
is a fiction:
It has been said that if a body is to move then there must exist an empty 
space into which it moves. This is just as compelling as if someone were 
to say that, if something to change colour, there must already exist a col-
our which it then takes on. (quoted in Smith 1990: 169)
Adding in a footnote:
And indeed why not also: if someone is to enter into marriage, then this 
marriage must already exist beforehand? (ibid.: fn. 3)
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3  Marty’s Radical Conception
We have seen that for Marty space is not a subjective form of intui-
tion. Mind-independent space would exist in the absence of anyone 
perceiving it (see Johansson, this volume). Nonetheless, when space is 
perceived, it is given with the sensible. Further, just as one cannot see 
colour without seeing extent, one cannot see space without seeing sen-
sible bodies. Importantly, however, this does not entail, pace the early 
Brentano, that space is to be identified with sensible bodies and the rela-
tions in which they stand to one another—it does not mean that ‘empty 
space’ is a fiction. So, what, then, is Marty’s radical alternative?
For Marty, empty space, at least on one understanding, is space that 
is not filled, where space is a positivity, or, more precisely, as I explain 
below, non-real existent (see also Johansson, this volume). Prima facie 
this might seem to align with Brentano’s later position, but this is not 
so. For Marty, whatever can be the subject of a true affirmative judge-
ment exists, where what is non-real in addition is non-real insofar as it 
cannot enter into causal relations. After Smith, let us call those objects 
that can enter into causal relations, and which Marty designates as ‘real’, 
energetic objects. Non-real entities are, by contrast, anergetic objects, 
among which are included collectives, states of affairs, values and, as we 
shall see, relations and space.
Now, that space is anergetic might tempt one into supposing that 
it is ideal and subjective. But Marty holds that it cannot be subjective 
for the nativist reasons he offers in critique of Kant. Yet nor can it be 
objective only through being identified with real bodies, as the earlier 
Brentano proposes. This not only runs counter to what I am calling 
the Naïve Presupposition, but leads too to an unacceptable scepticism, 
or at least reductionism, about movement. And once space is admit-
ted instead as a substance that individuates property instances, this 
 scepticism only grows. It is this latter Brentanian proposal that Marty’s 
proposal definitively wants to avert.
Substances are real for Marty, and they individuate property 
instances. Since movement is possible however—and here is Marty’s 
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10     C. Mac Cumhaill
identical things. Space then is not a substance, so defined. Rather it is, 
says Marty, a subsistent. Subsistents are like substances insofar as they do 
not ‘inhere’ in anything, but unlike substances subsistents are non-real. 
Thus, while property instances (accidents) inhere in substances, objects 
cannot be said to ‘inhere’ in space. Rather, Marty takes the relation 
of objects to space as brute and basic—they are said, again in the line 
with common parlance, to ‘fill’ it (we have called this relation ‘fulfil-
ment’; Johansson, this volume calls it ‘space-filling’; the German term is 
‘Raumerfüllung’).
With this much spelt out, we can finally detail out the nature of spa-
tial relations for Marty. Spatial relations hold between positions in space:
As far as location [Ortlichkeit ] by itself is concerned it is uncontroversial 
that the relations of being outside and of being side by side are grounded 
local relations that presuppose absolute places as their grounding funda-
menta. (RZ, §7: 24)14
Like all relations, spatial relations are themselves non-real. Nonetheless, 
they are grounded in space, itself an objective non-real existent (see 
Johansson 1990 for discussion).
4  Marty, Husserl and a Contemporary 
Translation
Let us gather together some claims that have been sketched, and 
grant that, from the contemporary perspective, a rather exotic picture 
emerges.
– Space is existent; it is the subject of true affirmative judgement.
– Its manner of existence is that it subsists; nothing inheres in it.
– Space is a positivity.
– Space is anergetic.
– Space is non-real.
– Space is not a quality-less form of intuition.
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– Objects fill space, where the relation of objects to space is sui 
 generis—it is one of fulfilment.
– Space cannot be intuited without the presentation of something 
sensible.
To make this latter point a little clearer, let us distinguish subsistent 
space from substantial form. Unlike Brentano and Stumpf, Marty doesn’t 
think that we only perceive substantial form. The relation of  substantial 
form to subsistent space is, recall, one of fulfilment (space-filling), 
where empty space is subsistent space that is unfilled. Can we assume, 
therefore and further, that Marty supposes that empty space can be 
perceived?
Two considerations might be offered here. First, Marty’s opening 
exploration appeals directly to empty space. The concept of an empty 
space is of a region that can be passed through. Such spaces can be sub-
jects of true affirmative judgement. Second, the concept of an empty 
space is not the concept of a pure form of intuition, but, arguably, the 
concept of a region that is empty of body. Since, however, Marty denies 
that space is to be identified with sensible bodies and the relations in 
which they stand to one another, even while he holds that we cannot 
perceive space without also perceiving something sensible, it is argua-
ble that he ought to be prepared to grant that we perceive empty space. 
Why? Since he allows that we perceive space tout court; both filled and 
unfilled (to wit: empty) spatial regions.
I consider this line of thinking attractive, and it guides what fol-
lows.16 However, further work is needed to establish Marty’s final view 
on the possibility of our perceiving empty space—a question over which 
Brentano, Stumpf and Husserl all waver. To this extent while the explo-
rations that follow are Martyan insofar as they are in the spirit of Marty, 
they might not be wholly to the letter. My task in the remainder of the 
paper is to consider Martyan space perception, thus understood, in 
the light of contemporary philosophy of perception. I take this to be 
a useful exercise since Marty, as I read him, offers a host of conceptual 
resources that suggest ways of reframing questions about space percep-
tion and perceptual experience more generally, in ways I hope to show-
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12     C. Mac Cumhaill
The explorations that follow then are rough. Even so, it strikes me 
that two lessons already follow from what I have drawn out so far. 
Setting these out helps frame the course of the rest of the paper.
First, for Marty, space is a non-real existent, not a subjective form 
of intuition. This being so, it might be thought that any philosophy 
of perception that endorses the thought that space itself is a subjective 
form of intuition—rather than something that can be presented under a 
subjective or ideal mode of presentation say—is non-Martyan.17
Second, since space is non-real on this Martyan picture, it is aner-
getic. Hence any philosophy of perception which necessitates a causal 
theory of perception, even where this is treated counterfactually, or one 
whereby our receptivity extends only to sensible matter, is also at odds 
with Marty.
These two lessons touch on Marty’s anti-Kantian misgivings on the 
one hand, and his anti-Brentanian considerations on the other. Space 
is not ideal (anti-Kantian), and nor can it be identified with corporeal, 
substantial bodies (anti-Brentanian). On the assumption that space can 
be an object of experience, however, rather than a subjective form of 
intuition, and on the assumption that space is something anergetic that 
exists in addition to the objects it fills, a question is suggested. What 
philosophical theory of perception could embrace a Martyan space 
 perception, this much assumed?
Begin with orthodoxy. Many forms of standard representationalism, 
where this is taken to be a thesis concerning the fundamental nature of 
experience, should run into difficulty on the second count—viz. where 
the anergetic nature of space is acknowledged. This is since veridical 
experience is typically taken to be experience that has been caused in 
the right way, where here the appeal is to experiential states and their 
causes. In addition, externalists emphasise a history of causal interac-
tion with properties or kinds represented. But this being so, the ineffica-
ciousness of space should make problematic the individuation of certain 
aspects of spatial content.18
These twin difficulties suggest to me that we should leave representa-
tionalism aside, and I do so for the most part of the remainder paper. 
But the standard palette of philosophical theories of perception is more 
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what follows, I will suggest that it is plausible to think that Martyan 
perception embraces some form of Naïve Realist relational theory; how 
we should characterise this is something I turn to in the next section. 
Before that however, it is worth querying whether the kind of structure 
of experience that the sense-datum theorist envisages, also a relationist 
of sorts, could plausibly apply to experience of space, including, criti-
cally, experience of empty regions.
For the purposes of this paper, I will treat the philosophical con-
cept of a sense-datum functionally. Call a sense-datum whatever it is 
that we are immediately aware of in experience, in virtue of which, in 
non-hallucinatory perception, we are mediately aware of worldly objects 
and their properties.19 Assume, here, that experience has an act/object 
structure and, further, that demonstrative reference to worldly objects 
is secured in virtue of the experience of or sensing of sense data. After 
H. H. Price, call the relation between the sense-datum and that which 
is indirectly or mediately perceived in virtue of the sensing of the 
sense-datum ‘belonging’. Take it that belonging is a non-causal relation.20
Now, supposing that sense-datum ‘belongs to’ the worldly object 
sensed in virtue of the sensing of it (the sense-datum), we might ask: 
Could there be a space-presenting sense-datum in virtue of which non-
real objective space is perceived and could be demonstrated?
If my reading of Marty is on the right track, the relevant sense-datum 
could not be ideal or subjective, though it could plausibly be private (cf. 
Johansson 2018). Importantly, however, it cannot be entirely  insensible. 
The notion of an insensible sense-datum is hardly a happy one, but, 
as we have seen, Marty anyway insists that space cannot be perceived 
in the absence of the perception of some local quality. Yet even if this 
much is granted we might wonder: How could a space-presenting sense- 
datum belong to its object?
Belonging is perhaps no more mysterious in the case of space per-
ception than it is in the case of objects. Still, from the functional per-
spective we have adopted above, belonging, whatever its nature, must 
allow for the kind of cleavage on which arguments from conflicting 
appearances to the existence of sense-data spin. That is, belonging ought 
to be consistent with the putative immediate objects of experience hav-
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worldly items mediately perceived in virtue of the sensing of sense data. 
Thus, we want to allow that an elliptical sense-datum can ‘belong’ to a 
circular coin.
It is not clear that Marty would be willing to admit such disparity or 
conflict between entities that can be said to putatively ‘belong’ together. 
Why so? As Smith (1990: 137) explains ‘consciousness, for Marty, is 
itself just a variety of assimilation of mental processes to (real or non-
real) objects in the world’. He likens Marty’s position to that given by 
Aristotle in De anima, quoting the following passages:
What has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived 
object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its 
being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end 
of the process the one acted upon has become assimilated to the other.  
(De anima, 418 a 2ff.)
Within the soul the faculties of cognition and sensation are potentially 
these objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible. These 
faculties, then, must be identical either with the things themselves, or 
with their forms. Now they are not identical with the objects; for the 
stone does not exist in the soul, but only the form of the stone. (De 
anima, 431 b 26ff.)
Commenting on the parity, Smith writes:
Similarly, now, for Marty, all psychic activity is a process which has as its 
consequence that the psychic activity comes into a certain sui generis sort 
of conformity with something other than itself. (Ibid.)
Smith’s exegesis makes it plausible to suggest that the metaphors of ‘con-
formity’ and ‘assimilation’ are more aptly applied to Martyan percep-
tion than the metaphor of ‘belonging’, where conflict or non-conformity 
is even implied or permitted. But, if so, then this suggests that Marty’s 
position is quite different from those versions of sense-datum theory 
that lend themselves to being characterised functionally in the way I 
have above. Instead, it seems closer to a distinct form of relationism: 
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[T]he objects we are consciously acquainted with in perceptual experi-
ence are constitutive of conscious character: the aspects of the world that 
we are acquainted with in perceptual experience constitutively ‘shape 
the contours of the subject’s conscious experience’ (Martin 2004: 64). 
Perceptual experiences have the characters they have because of, or in 
virtue of, the nature and character of the mind-independent objects they 
involve. (French, forthcoming)
Beck (2018) notes a list of adherents:
Brewer (2011: 100), Campbell (2002: 116), Fish (2009: 49–50), French 
(2014: 395–396), Logue (2012, p. 212), Martin (1998, pp. 173–175) 
and other naive realists all hold that the items a subject perceives in hav-
ing a perception constitutively shape the perception’s phenomenology.
There are, I propose, two features of this understanding of Naïve 
Realism as a thesis about perceptual phenomenology that bring us 
closer to a Martyan space perception (for further discussion see Beck 
[2018]).
First, on Naïve Realism conceptual space may be made for aner-
getic objects. This is since there is no requirement that the aspects of 
the world that shape the contours of consciousness be real or energetic. 
Thus, arguably shadows can shape the contours of consciousness.
Second, it appears that insofar as worldly objects ‘shape the con-
tours of the subject’s conscious experience’, conscious experience can 
be understood to ‘assimilate’ its objects, where here assimilation means 
the ‘taking in’, or ‘picking up’, or as Naïve Realists sometimes put it, 
the involvement of objects in experience. Call the Assimilation Thesis the 
central theoretical Naïve Realist tenet that the aspects of the world that 
we are acquainted with in perceptual experience constitutively shape 
the contours of the subject’s conscious experience. Strictly speaking, we 
can make sense of involvement without Assimilation and a theorist may 
be committed to the former but not the latter; the metaphysical struc-
ture of experience is such that it just ensures that objects are involved. 
Nonetheless, if we read Naïve Realism as a thesis about not only the 
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is granted that Assimilation entails involvement, then it is fair to pit the 
Assimilation Thesis as a central tenet.
Now, there is reason to think that the theoretical puzzle that I used 
to partly frame this chapter can be dissolved on such a Naïve Realism. 
I asked: If space can be an object of experience rather than a subjective 
form of intuition, and if it is something anergetic that exists in addi-
tion to the objects it fills, what philosophical theory of perception could 
embrace a Martyan space perception? Naïve Realism is a contender since 
on Naïve Realism it can be granted that non-efficacious entities, includ-
ing empty regions, can shape the contours of consciousness, such that the 
phenomenal character of experience is fundamentally constituted by those 
entities and regions, recognising, as Marty does, that we cannot perceive 
space in the absence of the perception of local quality. Necessarily, when 
we see empty regions we see sensible objects. Both are, to borrow a term 
from Husserl, co-seen.21 This congruence notwithstanding, however, the 
theoretical translation is not seamless. Let us explore why.
For most Naïve Realists, the Assimilation Thesis goes hand in hand 
with a further doctrine. Cast neutrally, this is the idea that perceiving 
involves the obtaining of a perceptual relation whereby the perceiving 
subject ‘stands’ in a perceptual relation to mind-independent worldly 
objects. For most Naïve Realists, it is in virtue of the perceiver stand-
ing in a perceptual relation to mind-independent worldly objects that 
those objects can play their character constituting role—to wit, by 
shaping the contours of consciousness. Different theorists have differ-
ent ways of articulating this idea. Some speak of a relation of ‘conscious 
acquaintance’; others refer to the obtaining of a ‘psychological relation 
of acquaintance’—both technical notions. Sometimes ‘conscious atten-
tion’ is appealed to, but very often the perceptual relation is spelt out as 
a relation of awareness. For instance, Soteriou (2013) writes (comment-
ing on a passage from Moore’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’):
Sensory experience somehow involves some kind of psychological rela-
tion of awareness, and not simply some psychological event, process, state, 
or property. In this context, to say that the relation of awareness is a psy-
chological one isn’t simply to say that one of the relata of the relation is 
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also non-psychological relations that psychological subjects can stand in to 
things. The suggestion appears to be that when one has a sensory experience 
there obtains a distinctive psychological relation that one stands in to some 
sensory quality, where that sensory quality is not a quality of the psychologi-
cal relation. The awareness of blue is not itself blue. (Soteriou 2013: 13)
Importantly, for many theorists, this relation is primitive.
Now, there is reason to think that Marty would partly concur with 
this picture. In a letter to Husserl, written in 1901 from a ‘well-wooded 
and charming area of the Bohemian Mittelgebirge’, he iterates the fol-
lowing two points, responding to objections from Husserl22:
1. You [Husserl] argue: if an act is a relation to an object and if the 
object, as is normally the case, is transcendent, then on my view it 
would follow that the transcendent object exists necessarily. Thus, 
this view (that if a presenting exists then a presented something exists 
too) cannot be correct. But what does transcendent object mean? 
Doubtless an object that does not exist merely in consciousness. But 
a presented something exists. Whether this something exists outside 
consciousness has nothing to do with the presentation as such […]
2. Now another of your objections seems to be: according to me the 
object of a presentation of blue would not be ‘blue’ but ‘presented 
blue’. But the object presented in a presentation is in fact ‘the same 
object that is judged about in the corresponding judgment and loved 
in the corresponding state of love’. This object is just blue not the 
presented blue. I entirely agree with this assertion of yours. The 
object of the presentation of blue is: blue, not: presented blue”.
I suggest that 2 might be recruited against reading Marty’s position 
along sense-datum lines—after all, it is ‘the same object that is judged 
about in the corresponding judgement and loved in the corresponding 
state of love’. While 1 can be read as gesturing at the Assimilation Thesis 
and an associated relationism. This is so at least in the following sense. 
For the Naïve Realist, in order that worldly objects can play a character 
constituting, consciousness-shaping role, the perceptual relation must 
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objects that partly shape phenomenal character exist, but not that they 
exist necessarily. I pick up the further matter of ‘presenting’ below.
For all that, however, there are significant differences between Marty’s 
position and the Naïve Realism I have articulated above. These can 
be brought into view by sketching a challenge for the Naïve Realist 
attracted by Marty’s unusual take on space. For the Naïve Realist, per-
ception involves a primitive perceptual relation. But for Marty all 
relations, and not only spatial relations, are unreal. If there is such a 
perceptual relation then, it is a non-real relation. What kind of Naïve 
Realism can be developed, starting from this assumption? I make some 
tentative suggestions in the next section.
5  Space for Naïve Realism?
To begin, on a Martyan Naïve Realism, the perceptual relation ought 
not to be conceived as primitive in the sense of brute or unanalysable. 
The relation is non-real, as all relations are. Further, it is grounded. 
In Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und 
Sprachphilosophie, Marty writes that ‘the peculiar relationship of con-
sciousness to its object’ is a special kind of grounded relation (quoted 
in Johansson 1990: 191). Johansson reads Marty as supposing that non-
real relations can be grounded in non-real entities like space and time, 
as well as in real entities. Start by considering only real worldly relata of 
the putative perceptual relation—for instance, a cherry tree.
All Naïve Realists teach that when a perceiver sees something, a par-
ticular cherry tree say, she stands in a perceptual relation to that thing, 
where standing in this relation explains why the cherry tree, in this 
case, can play a consciousness-shaping role. It should be plain by now, 
I hope, that merely being a psychological subject isn’t sufficient to field 
the subject-end of the relation since such a subject can stand in man-
ifold non-psychological relations to things—as when asleep and the 
cheery tree is outside the window. Rather, the relevant relatum must be 
a psychological subject in a certain conscious state or in whom certain 
conscious occurrences are unfolding.23 I suggest that Marty assumes this 
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Presenting […] is a real process in the mind. In case there exists that which 
one calls the presented, then as a non-real consequence of the process it fol-
lows that the presenting mind stands to this thing in a peculiar relation, 
which might be described as an ideal similarity or adequacy. (U: 406, 
quoted in Smith 1990: 125)
And when ‘presenting’ occurs Marty writes:
What really exists within us is not a peculiar, modified double of the real 
object, but only the real psychic process to which in certain circumstances 
there becomes attached as consequence an ideal similarity with some-
thing other, existing independently of this process. (ibid.: 415f., quoted 
in Smith, ibid.)
Importantly, on this view then, to say that the experience ‘has an 
object’—the presented—is not to suppose that the presented is a 
‘ double’, some kind of sensory image of the real object say. For in cir-
cumstances where ‘there exists that which one calls the presented’, the 
object that the experience has, is the object that exists independently of 
the presenting—to wit, the worldly object. Accordingly, the experience 
‘has an object’ necessarily in the sense that the present existence of the 
object is a requirement on the existence of process that is the presenting 
of an existing object.24
Support for this reading comes, I think, from a distinction that 
Marty makes between the relations of correlation and relative determi-
nation. The relation of correlation entails the coexistence of its relata 
(Mulligan 1990: 19)—though, as we have seen, in the perceptual case, 
the subject-end of the relatum cannot simply be a psychological subject, 
but one for whom there is a presenting of an existing object, a present-
ing which thus has an existent object necessarily but which does not in 
turn necessitate the existence of its object.
But experiences can also ‘have an object’ in a different sense (see 
Egidi 1990 for discussion). Experiences are often said to ‘have an object’ 
insofar as they are typically taken to be intentional. Insofar as experi-
ences are taken to be intentional however, they may also seem to involve 
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mental states of various sorts. It is notable that for Brentano this appar-
ent relational structure is only apparently relational; in fact, it involves 
a ‘complex of presentations’ which involves instead ‘relative determina-
tions’ (Smith 1990: 126), where the complexity of the relevant presenta-
tions is relative in the following sense. Brentano supposes that where 
one thing is thought of (or experienced) relative to another, that which 
is thought of or experienced directly is said to be thought of or expe-
rienced ‘in modo recto ’, while that which is thought of or experienced 
relative to what is thought of or experienced directly, is thought of or 
experienced ‘in modo obliquo ’—viz. relative to that which is thought 
of in the direct mode. Importantly, in cases of relative determination 
that which is thought of or experienced in modo recto must exist, if that 
which is relative is to exist. But that which is presented in modo obliquo 
need not exist (except in certain cases). But as such, on this understand-
ing, an experience can have an object in the second sense (the intentional 
sense), while not having an object in the first sense (the transcendent 
sense). Chisholm (1990: 2) details Brentano’s application of this distinc-
tion to sensation in a 1914 manuscript:
[Brentano] makes two remarkable statements. The first is: ‘In sensing 
I am the sole object that is presented in recto [das einzige in recto vorg-
estellte Objekt] ’. The second is: ‘The thing that we have as external object 
is sensed only in obliquo…. It is sensed as sensed by us’.
As we have seen however, Marty appears to insist that presenting of 
an existent object involves correlation—the necessary coexistence of its 
relata. As such, this demands the existence of the object of experience in 
the first, transcendent sense, and not merely as a relative determination 
within a complex presentation.
Now, it might be objected that the obtaining of a relation of correla-
tion is consistent with contemporary forms of  representationalism that 
likewise deny the existence of an internal ‘double’ of the real object— 
I am thinking here of what Fish designates as ‘strong’ versions of rep-
resentationalism (2010: 67)—and insofar as Marty often speaks of cor-
relation in terms of ‘adequation’ or ‘correctness’ this reading might seem 
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space, as a non-real objective entity, is a possible object of experience in 
the first sense, it is, I think, possible to resist this interpretation. Why? 
Space is anergetic. There is then a question for the representationalist 
as to how space can ‘get into experience’—viz. be represented—without 
itself having any causal impact on the subject.25 One promising strat-
egy, surely, is to appeal, simply, to relations between things and to rep-
resent those relations. But it not clear that Marty would find the mere 
representation of spatial relations between things satisfactory. This is 
because he seems to think that the spatial relations are themselves also 
presented to us in experience (bearing in mind, recall, that these are 
grounded in space). He writes:
We find them [spatial relations] there before us, and if this were not so, if 
they were a product of our psychic activity, then how would things stand 
with regard to the objectivity of our entire knowledge of nature […]? (U: 
468, quoted in Smith 1990: 126)
However, it is plausible to think that, for the representationalist, spa-
tial relations are precisely not ‘there before us’ but are only represented as 
ways things are arrayed or stand relative to each other and the perceiver. 
But, as such, spatial relations cannot be presented in experience directly 
and nor is there any possibility of their playing a character-shaping role. 
This former point is in essence the criticism that Marty wages against 
Brentano’s reduction of non-real spatial relations to relative determina-
tions in complex (intentional) presentations (see Egidi 1990 for discus-
sion). Johansson (2014) suggests a way of transposing this objection to 
the contemporary scene, formulating Naïve Realism as the conjunction 
of the following four broad theses:
(a)  the perceiving subject and the perceived object are two distinct 
entities where none is part of the other26;
(b)  there is a distance between the subject and the object, but the sub-
ject and the object are nonetheless in some sense connected;
(c) the distance between the subject and the object is empty;
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He notes:
The term ‘distance’ adds something important to the view that, necessar-
ily, consciousness is consciousness of something. The conjunction of the 
statements (a) and (d) says that perception is always perception of some-
thing, but it does not bring in any notion of distance; this is done in (b) 
and (c). (RZ, 3)
But, for a Brentanian, arguably, (b) and (c) are subsumed into (a) and 
(d) inasmuch as the ofness (a) and directedness (d) of intentional expe-
rience might be supposed sufficient to capture the phenomenology that 
(b) and (c) articulates. For the contemporary representationalist in addi-
tion, experience might be said to be ‘of ’ or about distance—the empty 
distance between the subject and object say. Such regions must be rep-
resented. But for Marty, who resists the ideality or subjectivity of space 
as a form of intuition, insisting too that space is anergetic, such regions 
are, and are presented as being, there, before us.27
Now, so far, I have suggested reasons for thinking that the Martyan 
position I am constructing should be found sympathetic to contem-
porary Naïve Realism, specifically insofar as it seems to endorse a cor-
relational account of the relation which requires the existence of, and 
is dependent on, the worldly consciousness-shaping objects that such 
experiences thereby have. On this understanding, perceptual correla-
tion involves Assimilation. As noted, correlation is a non-real relation. 
Earlier, however, I noted that most Naïve Realists characterise the per-
ceptual relation as one of awareness. I now want to suggest that this 
spells trouble for the attempt at a theoretical transposition.
6  Awareness Versus Correlation
To begin, we ought to grant that perceptual awareness requires more 
than perceptual correlation. It requires relative determination insofar as 
it requires that the experience or episode of perceptual awareness have 
an object in both senses detailed above. Second, perceptual awareness is 
typically understood as reflexive in the sense best characterised by quot-
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To be aware of the sensation of blue is not to be aware of a mental image -  
of a ‘thing’, of which ‘blue’ and some other element are constituent parts 
in the same sense in which blue and glass are constituents of a blue bead. 
It is to be aware of an awareness of blue; awareness being used, in both 
cases, in exactly the same sense. (Moore 1903: 25)
That perceptual awareness involves awareness of awareness explains why 
sensory experience, so understood, can be meaningfully cast as a kind of 
knowing, as the Naïve Realist often insists—this follows from the claim 
that experience is direct acquaintance with mind-independent worldly 
things and events, etc. But that awareness could be a kind of knowing 
is also, one would think, explained by the fact that genuine perception 
involves what Marty calls correlation: it involves the presentation of an 
existent object.28
Now, although perceptual awareness requires more than perceptual 
correlation insofar as the former but not the latter is conceived to have 
an object in the second sense as well as the first, and insofar as the latter, 
but not necessarily the former, involves reflexive awareness, it is also the 
case that many Naïve Realists deny that we are aware of anything in 
hallucination. This might seem to tally with Marty since although per-
ceptual awareness requires more than correlation, correlation demands 
the coexistence of its relata. If this requirement were ‘inherited’ by 
awareness then, it would follow that in the absence of the existence of 
the object apparently presented, as in hallucination, there could be no 
awareness. Marty, I suspect, would say differently.
On the Martyan picture I am sketching, in hallucination, there may 
be relative determination without correlation. Cast differently, the hallu-
cinatory experience does not ‘have an object’ in the first, transcendent 
sense, but it does in the second, intentional sense. It is worth harnessing 
G. E. M. Anscombe’s criticism of the Ordinary Language philosopher 
in her difficult paper ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical 
Feature’ to make sense of this.
In saying that Marty seems to allow that hallucination involves the 
presenting of a non-existent object, it might be thought that the use of 
‘object’ deployed here is that which is also admitted by the sense-datum 
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such cases (or in thinking of entities like unicorns say) we are aware of, 
in experience (or in our thinking of ), some thing. But Marty does not 
seem to have this particular understanding of ‘object’ in mind, at least 
in the case of hallucination. This is because he seems to think that in 
these cases the meaning of ‘object’ is transferred from cases where pred-
icates are applied to real objects; there is a kind of linguistic Bild, or fic-
tion of inner linguistic form, as though:
one were to allow the person portrayed to inhabit the portrait because of 
the similarity between the contours and colours of the painted bit of can-
vas and those of the portrayed body or face. (RZ, §12: 58)
This recalls G. E. M. Anscombe’s critique of both the Ordinary 
Language philosopher and the sense-datum theorist. Both theorists 
offer an ontological response to the question ‘what do you see?’ That is, 
they respond by giving the name of entities, things—everyday objects 
or, alternatively, sense data—as things seen. But while the Ordinary 
Language theorist denies that we see anything in hallucination—since 
what we see are ordinary things—the sense data insists that we see some 
thing, some data of sense! In contrast, Anscombe recommends a gram-
matical approach. The objects of sensation are not things, in the weighty 
ontological sense but direct objects of the sensation verb. Thus, we can 
intelligibly say that we see things even in cases where it is evident to all, 
including the speaker, that no such thing exists in the perceiver’s vicin-
ity. How does this shift from ontology to grammar help the Martyan 
theorist, who is nonetheless tempted by Naïve Realism with respect to 
the nature of phenomenal character?
Notice that when the Naïve Realist denies, as she typically does, that 
in hallucinatory experience we are aware of anything, in doing so, she 
preserves the sense of ‘thing’ that applies in the good,  non-hallucinatory 
case—this is precisely why she denies that we are aware of anything in 
the hallucinatory case. It strikes me, however, that a Martyan Naïve 
Realist should want to urge that genuine perception involves correla-
tion and that this is what grounds phenomenal character, but without 
deploying what is ostensibly a linguistic picture to articulate the met-
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insist that in hallucinatory experience we cannot say that something 
is seen). To clarify: sensation verbs take direct objects. The verb ‘to be 
aware’ though not a sensation verb strictly speaking also takes a gram-
matical object. The Naïve Realist, in noting that in hallucination, 
by definition, there is nothing in the world that answers the subject’s 
description of what they ‘see’, and in supposing that phenomenal char-
acter is partly constituted by the worldly objects of which the perceiver 
is putatively aware, may be tempted to suppose both that nothing is 
seen—i.e. the subject is mistaken in her use of that term, that she is not 
thereby aware of anything—and, further, that the experience thereby 
lacks phenomenal character.
The Martyan picture is more circumspect. It says only that hallucina-
tion involves the presenting of a non-existent object. But, if I am right, 
Marty does not want to read the notion of object here—an intentional 
notion—ontologically. Scholarly work is required to establish the scope 
and correctness of this claim.
7  ‘Raum’ and Room
To conclude, I want to sketch briefly two positive lessons that fall out of 
my attempt to provide for a Martyan Naïve Realism.
At the outset I noted what I called the Naïve Presupposition, which 
is just the perceptual datum that we do not take the spaces that bodies 
fill to be identical with them; and this is partly why it makes sense to 
say that things appear to be located at places. The Assimilation Thesis, 
recall, is the idea that perceptual conscious is fundamentally shaped by 
(or constituted by) worldly objects. We might not ask: Are these two 
conceptually or theoretically related?
I think it is plain that they are not conceptually related. Nonetheless, 
if the generic characterisation I have given of Naïve Realism above is 
accurate, they are, at least, theoretically related. How so?
For those theorists who think the perceptual relation is a relation 
of awareness, and where the possibility of Assimilation is explained by 
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of her experience, there may be a tendency to think that the Naïve 
Presupposition is likewise assured. Why so?
Awareness is a non-solipsistic relation. P. F. Strawson famously pro-
posed that a requirement on non-solipsistic consciousness is that a 
subject be able to conceive of things existing in the absence of her expe-
rience of them where this requires a conception of space. If having a 
conception of space is partially what grounds the phenomenology that 
the Naïve Presupposition is supposed to capture however, and where 
the possibility of awareness is secured when there is such a conception, 
awareness being non-solipsistic, then the Assimilation Thesis and the 
Naïve Presupposition should go hand in hand.
If we take Naïve Realism to be a thesis, only, about the fundamen-
tal nature of phenomenal character however, a weaker form of rela-
tionism may suffice. What form this may take, I leave for some other 
occasion, suffice to say that unyoking the Naïve Presupposition from the 
Assimilation Thesis opens up explanatory paths not much explored in 
contemporary analytic philosophy of perception. This is one reason for 
taking seriously Marty’s peculiar take on space—one which, as I under-
stand it, is nonetheless supposed to honour perceptual and linguistic 
data. Another is the following:
I began this paper by detailing a variety of ways in which the words 
‘place’ and ‘space’ can be used. I noted Marty’s inclusion in this list of 
the English word ‘room’, completely untheorised in contemporary 
analytic philosophy of perception—for various reasons, not uncon-
nected with the point above, ‘room’ just vanishes from contemporary 
analytic theorising (the Brentanian school is thereby an informative 
counterpoint).
Johansson, this volume, explains in what sense the concept of ‘a room’ 
helps isolate Marty’s conception of ‘Raum ’, with which it overlaps:
A room is regarded neither as some kind of relations between the things 
in it, nor as a contingent structure inhering in the properties of the things 
there. Also, rooms can always easily be thought of as being completely 
empty, as three-dimensional holes so to speak; and some of them are also 
so perceived. Such a room is homogenous in the sense that all its different 
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This gloss is illuminating. Empty rooms can be perceived—the empty 
space they enclose is co-seen with the walls which ‘line’ the room (recall, 
for Marty, we cannot see space without seeing localised quality). But 
there are a host of other uses that are relevant to the concept of space 
that contemporary analytic philosophers have almost wholly ignored. In 
English, ‘room’ can sometimes mean dimensional extent—the amount 
of space that is or may be taken up by a thing, event or process. In such 
cases, there may be ‘more’ or less ‘room’. Sometimes ‘room’ refers not to 
some dimensional extent but the capacity to accommodate a person or 
thing or to allow a particular kind of action; ‘room’ in this sense appears 
with modifying words such as ‘ample’, ‘enough’, ‘plenty of ’; sometimes 
there can be ‘no room’.
Marty takes it that spatial relations are there: ‘We find them there 
before us’. Space is not a nexus of spatial relations between real things 
on this view, a conception of which is a condition on the possibility 
of awareness and so, on certain views, experience. Nor are experienced 
spatial relations determined relative to ourselves, where we are experi-
enced in modo recto, and everything else in the oblique mode. Rather, 
on a Martyan understanding, as I have been telling it, there are exist-
ent ways in which our world is shaped, ways which in turn shape our 
consciousness.
Anscombe famously thought that no action could fail to have moral 
significance—even the plucking of a single flower. Assuming perceiving 
involves perceptual activity, it is hardly plausible that this demanding 
and austere thought could apply to Raum qua ‘space’. Yet although, as 
Johansson urges, Raum is homogeneous in its emptiness, ‘room’ in some 
of the above senses, which is also there—room for a person, or for an 
event—is not. And this suggests, at least to me, an unexplored place for 
the theorist of perception to retreat to, and ‘dwell in’ with her theories.
Notes
 1. Page numbers refer to the original edition text.
 2. For discussion, see Johansson, this volume, as well as Johansson (1990), 
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 3. Trans. Mulligan and Schuhmann, K. in Mulligan (1990: 225–236).
 4. Though intentional theories are sometimes presented as relational—
experience involves an intentional relation to sensible properties (that 
may or may not be instantiated)—I leave explicit consideration of this 
construal aside. See, for example, Pautz (2010).
 5. Marty’s work is untranslated. The exposition that follows is far from 
scholarly. I have been helped in my comprehension by the work of 
Chisholm, Johansson, Mulligan, Simons, Smith, and, particularly, 
Egidi in the 1990 volume ‘Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics’, edited by 
Kevin Mulligan. Hélène Leblanc and Mark Textor helped me with the 
translation of some puzzling passages. Special thanks to Craig French 
and Ingvar Johansson for insightful comments on an earlier draft.
 6. He supplements this point with an interesting and early discussion of 
modality-specific spatial fields, which I leave aside.
 7. Husserl is more explicit on this point in his 1907 Thing and Space lec-
tures: ‘It must be noted, however, that a given empty space is neces-
sarily an empty space between given things or phantom of things. If 
nothing spatial at all is given, then neither is any space’ (Husserl 
1997/1973: 323, fn. 1).
 8. See instead Mac Cumhaill (in preparation).
 9. Thanks to Mark Textor and Hélène Leblanc for suggestions as to how 
to translate this passage.
 10. See C. B. Martin (2006).
 11. See O. Massin (forthcoming) for a discussion of the conception of 
‘founded’ relations.
 12. See Barry Smith (1988) for discussion of Brentano’s notion of a contin-
uum, and the distinction, and relations, between spatial and temporal 
continua.
 13. Ingvar Johansson rightly points that if things are partly individuated 
with respect to places, there is no problem with movement.
 14. This translation appears in Johansson (1990: 153). Johansson notes 
that this characterisation leads to a peculiar consequence: there must be 
at least two different kinds of grounded relations—those grounded in 
something real (e.g. colour resemblance and difference of weight) and 
those grounded in something non-real (e.g. spatial relations).
 15. We can now see perhaps why Marty mostly favours the term ‘ausgebre-
itet’ (spread out) to characterise the relation of sensible matter to form, 
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 16. See, however discussion at §§17–18.
 17. Johansson (2018) argues that space is objective in Marty’s sense, but 
that the space of perceptual experience is nonetheless subjective. Since 
a careful elaboration of Johansson’s subtle and distinctive position 
requires the introduction of a number of concepts that are peculiar 
to Johansson (for instance the notion of intentional-logical distance), 
I treat his view directly and in detail elsewhere.
 18. Prima facie, Chalmers recent development of spatial functionalism 
(Chalmers 2006, 2012, forthcoming), a species of phenomenology-first 
representationalism where veridical space perception involves a Fregean 
manner of presentation, might seem to escape this difficulty. I leave the 
reader to follow this position up. I would suggest however that Fregean 
representationalism is also at odds with Marty’s picture, albeit for 
another reason: it makes visible space essentially ideal.
 19. I recognise that this functional treatment may be viewed as inadequate 
in a number of respects. It defines sense-data in terms of non-hallu-
cinatory experience rather than, as is more common, by appealing to 
historical responses to the argument for hallucination and illusion (see 
Fish 2010 for discussion). I do this for dialectical reasons. Second, my 
formulation may prompt epistemic worries—for instance, it might 
be thought that whether or not an entity is a sense datum cannot be 
determined until it is known whether experience is  non-hallucinatory. 
I don’t think this is a difficulty for a functional treatment for the 
kinds of reasons spelt out in Martin (2004). Further, it does not 
strike me that saying that a sense-datum is whatever one is aware of in 
 non-hallucinatory perception in virtue of which objects (say) are indi-
rectly sensed, does not preclude the further claim that hallucination 
involves entities of the same kind but in virtue of which nothing is 
sensed. Thanks to Ingvar Johansson for raising these worries.
 20. For discussion, H. H. Price (1932).
 21. See fn. 7.
 22. Translated by K. Mulligan and K. Schuhmann (1990).
 23. It is plausible to think that, for the world to play a consciousness-shap-
ing role, the subject must be awake. Merely being awake isn’t sufficient 
for perception however—one could be awake in a sensory-deprivation 
tank.
 24. To be clear: both according to Marty and Brentano, a presenting may 
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Marty, only the presenting of an existing object really has an object. 
This constitutes a difference between Brentano and the late Marty: 
Brentano maintained that even the presenting of a non-existing object 
has in a sense an object. Thanks to Giuliano Bacigalupo for emphasis-
ing this point.
 25. I leave aside the question as to how space could be phenomenally 
represented.
 26. An important though not unproblematic exception is of course when 
we perceive ‘ourselves’.
 27. Johansson distinguishes between material-logical and intentional- 
logical distance, an important and productive distinction that I discuss 
in Mac Cumhaill (in progress).
 28. Cf. Johansson (2014, Section 4).
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